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NOTES
FAMILY LAW - SINGLE ACT OF INTERCOURSE AS GROUNDS
FOR RECONCILIATION
Wife sued husband for separation from bed and board on the
ground of cruel treatment. Husband denied the acts of cruelty
and reconvened seeking a separation from bed and board on the
grounds of abandonment and cruelty. Lower court held for wife.
Court of appeal reversed on the basis that a reconciliation be-
tween the spouses had extinguished the action of separation
from bed and board. Held, wife's single voluntary act of sexual
intercourse between time of last difficulty and the day she left
the marital home condoned the prior acts of cruelty by the hus-
band and effected a reconciliation. Stewart v. Stewart, 175
So. 2d 692 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
The Civil Code states that an action of separation is extin-
guished by reconciliation of the parties after the occurrence of
facts which might have given rise to the action.1 The Code, how-
ever, fails to state what acts constitute a reconciliation.
The basic French view is that a reconciliation occurs when
the offended spouse renounces the right to seek a separation,
and restores the other spouse to his former status. 2 It is more
than forgiveness. In order to have a reconciliation, the offend-
ing spouse must accept the forgiveness and cease his miscon-
duct.3 At common law condonation (which has the same effect
as "reconciliation" in Louisiana, 4 although it is not necessarily
the same concept) occurs when one spouse forgives the other
for past misconduct and intends to renew or continue the mari-
tal relation.5
I. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 152 (1870): "The action of separation shall be
extinguished by the reconciliation of the parties, either after the facts which
might have given ground to such action, or after the action has been com-
menced."
2. 2 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITIE PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 110
534 (2d ed. 1952).
3. Alberti v. Dame Alberti, Cour de Cassation (Ch. Req.) July 17, 1906;
[1908] Sirey Recueil G~n4ral 1.75.
4. Hill v. Hill, 112 La. 770, 36 So. 678 (1904).
5. Glass v. Glass, 175 11d. 693, 2 A.2d 443 (1938) ; Forbis v. Forbis, 274
S.W.2d 800 (Mo. 1955) ; Ramsay v. Ramsay, 244 P.2d 381 (Nev. 1952) ; Belville
v. Belville, 114 Vt. 404, 45 A.2d 571 (1946).
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The Louisiana Supreme Court in 1922 stated:
"Under the authorities cited, it is clear, we think, that, in
order to constitute a reconciliation that would bar an action
for separation from bed and board, in the sense of article
152 of the Civil Code, there must be not only a mutual for-
giveness on the part of the injured spouse, and acceptance
by the offender, expressed or implied,'but there must be a
restoration and renewal of the marital relation."6
Since this time, most of the Louisiana decisions have dealt with
the question whether the offended spouse has condoned the prior
wrongful acts of the other spouse in determining if a reconcilia-
tion has been effected.7 Misconduct of the husband in allegedly
striking his wife was held to have been "condoned" by the wife
who had continued to live with her husband for more than four
years after the incident." Where parties resumed the marital
relation after knowledge by the injured spouse of adultery on
the part of the other, a court of appeal reasoned that the injured
spouse had "condoned and forgiven" the wrongful acts, and
hence the action for divorce had been extinguished.9 In short,
when it is found that one spouse has condoned or forgiven the
prior wrongful acts of the other spouse, the courts conclude
that a reconciliation has been effected.
For the court in the instant case, the question of "condona-
tion" was one to be decided on all the facts. The last alleged
acts of cruelty had occurred on Sunday. The wife, however,
did not leave the domicile until the following Tuesday, and
had shared a bed with her husband and engaged in an act of
sexual intercourse on Monday night. The court decided that
this voluntary act of sexual intercourse effected a reconcilia-
tion. The basic premise of the court was that "the act of inter-
course is the extreme fulfillment of the marital relationship.
The voluntary performance of this action on the part of peti-
tioner, and there is no evidence in the record to show it was
other than voluntary, could serve no purpose other than to
condone the prior acts of cruelty on the part of the defendant." 10
6. Martin v. Martin, 151 La. 530, 92 So. 46 (1922).
7. DeJean v. DeBose, 226 La. 600, 76 So. 2d 900 (1954); Abele v. Barker,
200 La. 125, 7 So. 2d 684 (1942) ; Collins v: Collins, 194 La. 446, 193 So. 702
(1940) ; Pichoni v. Pichon, 164 La. 272, 113 So. 845 (1927) ; Carriere v. Carriere,
147 So. 2d 668 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
8. Abele v. Barker, 200 La. 125, 7 So. 2d 684 (1942).
9. Smith v. Smith, 139 So. 2d 813, 816 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
10. Stewart v. Stewart, 175 So. 2d 692, 696 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
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It is important to note that there had been no break in the
marriage relationship in the instant case. In 1922 the Supreme
Court followed the French view"1 and held that reconciliation
presupposes a break in the marriage.12 The reasoning behind
such a requirement would seem to be that finding a reconcilia-
tion when there has been no break in the marriage would preju-
dice a spouse who continued to cohabit with the other spouse in
an effort to make the marriage a success. To hold in this sit-
uation that a reconciliation has been effected and the action
for separation has been extinguished might encourage a spouse
to interrupt the marital relation so as to avoid these conse-
quences. Subsequent decisions have not followed this interpreta-
tion of the word "reconciliation." In 1927 the Supreme Court
held that there had been no reconciliation where the wife re-
mained in the house but stayed in a separate room.' 8 The last
alleged act of cruelty had occurred on Saturday, and the wife
had not left the domicile until Tuesday. The court stated that
the wife's remaining in the house under those circumstances
did not constitute a forgiving of the husband's offense; pre-
sumably, different circumstances (such as sharing the same
room) might have amounted to a reconciliation. Thus the court
ignored the requirement that there be a break in the marriage.14
This seems the better view because a spouse can certainly for-
give the other spouse for past wrongs without interrupting
the marital situation. The question should be whether there
was in fact an intention to forgive the other spouse and either
to continue or to renew the marital relationship. A spouse's
patience in enduring wrongful acts would simply be a factor
to consider in determining whether there was such intent.
Article 153 of the Civil Code states that once the cause for
separation has been extinguished, the plaintiff is precluded from
bringing his action; but he shall be at liberty to bring a new
suit for causes arising since reconciliation, and therein to make
11. The French require a break in the marriage in order to have a reconcilia-
tion. 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 1208 (1959). The common law does not
generally require a break in the marriage. Many states define condonation in
terms of a continuance or resumption of the marital relation. 24 Am. JUR. 2d
Divorce and Separation § 211 (1966).
12. Martin v. Martin, 151 La. 530, 92 So. 46 (1922).
13. Pichon v. Pichon, 164 La. 272, 113 So. 845 (1927).
14. For other cases with similar reasoning and results see Humes v. McIntosh,
225 La. 930, 74 So. 2d 167 (1954) ; Mischler v. Duchman, 159 La. 478, 105 So.
559 (1925).
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use of the former motives to corroborate his new action.15 The
word "corroborate" as used in this article has been interpreted
to mean that the past wrongs cannot be used as part of the
cause of action for separation. An entirely new basis for the
action must exist. 16 It is submitted that a better interpretation
of the word "corroborate" would allow the past acts as part
of the cause of action for separation. Thus, the spouse who
bears cruel treatment would be more adequately protected. 1 7
The court in the instant case decided that the single act of
intercourse effected a reconciliation. Nothing in the text of
article 152 of the Civil Code warrants such a conclusion. It
seems reasonable to say that a single act may, considered with
other factors, evince a desire on the part of one spouse to for-
give the other and to continue the marital situation. It seems
dangerous, however, to place controlling emphasis on the na-
ture of the act.'8 The primary concern should be with inten-
tion. A spouse may have sexual relations with the other spouse,
yet have no intention or desire to forgive or to forego the pos-
sibility of separation, and no purpose to continue or renew the
marital relationship. Thus, the act of intercourse should be con-
sidered with other factors to determine the true intent of the
aggrieved spouse, and there should be no finding of reconcilia-
tion where the person required to forgive 9 does not do so. Per-
haps a spouse might continue to cohabit with the other spouse
simply to subserve interests of the children or of some other
person.2 0 Of course, repeated acts of sexual intercourse, even
in the absence of other evidence of intent, would create a strong
15. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 153 (1870): "In either case the plaintiff shall
be precluded from bringing his action; but he shall be at liberty to bring a new
suit for causes arising since the reconciliation, and therein make use of th
former motives to corroborate his new action."
16. Ellois v. Ellois, 145 So. 2d 123 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
17. It is admitted that the spouse in the cruel treatment situation is given
some protection in that the courts have consistently held that the forbearance
of a spouse in enduring cruel treatment from the other spouse should not be
construed as reconciliation barring her action for separation from bed and board.
New v. New, 186 La. 1017, 173 So. 748 (1937) ; Carriere v. Carriere, 147 So. 2d
668 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) ; Magliolo v. Magliolo, 135 So. 2d 616 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1961) ; Seeling v. Seeling, 133 So. 2d 161 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
18. Stewart v. Stewart, 175 So. 2d 692, 696 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
19. Forgive is used in the sense of consenting not only to ignore the injury,
but also to continue the marital relation.
20. Perhaps the wife may have submitted in order to avoid an argument with
her husband because she believed it would be in the 'best interest of her children
not to subject them to such turmoil. Other possible reasons for the wife's action
would be a sense of marital obligation in that she believed she had no right
to refuse, and perhaps even fear.
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presumption of an intention to forgive and continue the rela-
tionship. The conclusion that must be drawn from all the facts
is that the offended spouse intended to forgive the other spouse
and to renew or continue the marital relation. Thus, where a
single act of sexual intercourse is engaged in, and the facts show
that the offended spouse never intended to continue the marital
situation, there should not be an extinguishment of the action for
separation based on reconciliation of the parties.
Cary G. deBessonet
JURISDICTION IN PERSONAM OVER NONRESIDENT CORPORATIONS
A Louisiana resident injured while employed on an oil rig
in the Persian Gulf brought a workmen's compensation action
against his employers, several Panamanian oil corporations, in
a Louisiana court. The oil companies had recruited employees,
including the plaintiff, in Louisiana to work on an oil rig built
and repaired in Louisiana for operation in the Persian Gulf;
but the companies had neither qualified to do business in Lou-
isiana nor consented to be sued there. The trial court sustained
defendants' exceptions to its jurisdiction in personam. The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. Held, defendants'
"business activity" within Louisiana had been sufficient to give
the state's courts jurisdiction under La. R.S. 13:3471 (1) ex-
tending Louisiana's personal jurisdiction over nonresident cor-
porations. Babineaux v. Southeastern Drilling Co., 170 So. 2d
518 La. App. 3d Cir. (1965), writs refused: "The ruling on the
plea to the jurisdiction in personam is correct." 247 La. 613,
614, 615, 172 So. 2d 700, appeal dismissed for want of a sub-
stantial federal question, 382 U.S. 16.1
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington,2 the United States
Supreme Court recognized that a state could, without violating
due process, require a foreign corporation to defend a suit in
its courts if the corporation had sufficient minimum contacts
with the state so that maintenance of the suit would not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. ' 3 The
1. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1964-1965 Term -
Civil Procedure, 26 LA. L. REV. 581 (1966).
2. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See Student Symposium, Personal Jurisdiction, 26
LA. L. REV. 350, 361, 391 (1966).
3. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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